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NATURE OF BARGAINING AGREEMENT
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT:
ITS NATURE AND SCOPE
CHARLES 0. GREGORYt
In this paper I shall discuss some of the aspects of collective
bargaining and labor agreements as these things look to a law
professor. Although I have had considerable experience on War
Labor Board panels and as an arbitrator, I know very little at
first hand about the actual bargaining process. Hence, in this
connection I shall confine my remarks to the coercive bargain-
ing techniques of unions. And in connection with the collective
agreement, most of what I say will concern its legal nature.
Collective bargaining, as we know .it today, is the substitution
of bilateral for unilateral decisions in the field of labor-manage-
ment relations. It normally leads to a collective labor agreement
between the negotiating parties. The whole process, from the
union's demands to enforcement of the contract, occurs in a
complicated context of federal and state labor laws. Manage-
ment and the unions are still trying to catch up with these laws.
In the meanwhile, our lawmakers seem unable to make up their
own minds. Many partisans are impatient with the law, saying
that it defeats the ends of true collective bargaining. But all
conflicts of interest must be governed by laws of some kind.
This is especially true of the struggle for power going on in the
labor relations arena.
The law must set a limit on the manner in which this struggle
is conducted. Then it must define the proper objectives of this
conflict for power. Most people probably do not think of collec-
tive bargaining as recourse to economic pressures. But the
union's best bargaining tools are the strike, the boycott and the
picket line. With modern anti-injunction laws, the Wagner Act,
removal of unions from under the Sherman Act, and the Su-
preme Court's protection of picketing as free speech, these tools
became very potent. And while the Fair Labor Standards Act,
as applied, has tended to disrupt smooth collective bargaining,
yet it has given the unions strong floors to stand upon. At the
same time, management's recourses to counter pressures were
t Profesor of Law, University of Chicago School of Law.
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drastically curtailed by the Wagner Act. That law forbade the
use of economic coercion against employees and virtually abol-
ished the area within which management could refuse to bargain
at all.
After 1937, powerful unions became established where they
could never before get footholds; and they acquired bargaining
power never before dreamed of. Immune from the laws against
monopolistic practices, they have been making hay while their
political sun was shining. But since 1947 their sun seems to be
on the wane. This is plain from the passage and retention of
the Taft-Hartley Act. But it is almost more apparent from the
output of the courts. Some of these judicial developments are
important in their effect upon union bargaining power.
The NLRA declares that employees shall have the right to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection. And the right to
strike still remains substantially unaffected by that Act. Now
most unions don't like to strike; and they certainly don't want
to get caught violating no-strike pledges. Hence, union officials
have thought up ingenious ways of getting the effects of a strike,
without actually calling one. Examples range from prayer meet-
ings during working hours to have the Lord soften the employ-
er's heart, to a continuous unadjourned union business meeting
lasting for several days. They include the slow-down as well as
the insistence of employees upon performing their work in a
manner agreeable to them. The Wisconsin Briggs-Stratton case
is a good example.' Over a period of four months the union
called 26 short business meetings during working hours. These
meetings were unscheduled and were called without any advance
warning. The members simply laid down their tools and walked
to the union hall. No bargaining demands were made because
the union claimed it was not striking. The effect on production
was disastrous. Apparently this was a softening-up strategy.
Briggs-Stratton did not discipline the union employees.
Rather, it asked the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to
order this practice stopped. That Board issued an order pro-
hibiting these stoppages; the Wisconsin courts enforced this
order; and the union appealed to the Supreme Court on consti-
1. International Union, U. A. W., A. F. of L., Local 232 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board (1949) 336 U. S. 245, 69 S. Ct. 516.
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tutional grounds. In March the Supreme Court upheld Wiscon-
sin's power to prevent this practice. But dissenting justices
declared that this was a denial of recourse to concerted economic
bargaining pressures guaranteed in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The majority insisted that no such guaranty has ever
been made by Congress in that Act.
This decision curtails the collective bargaining power of
unions in the federal arena. It means that the states may pass
statutes declaring unlawful certain new types of peaceful union
economic practices. It has been assailed on the ground that it
deprives the Federal Labor Board of its proper jurisdiction over
matters of this kind. But as Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out,
there was nothing in this case to go to the NLRB. The union
conduct involved was not illegal under the Taft-Hartley Act;
and by not firing any of its employees engaging in these work
stoppages, Briggs-Stratton had astutely avoided handing the
union a Section 8 (a) (3) discrimination charge.
But supposing Briggs-Stratton had fired the leaders of this
strategy and 8 (a) (3) discrimination charges had been filed?
It is not at all clear that the Federal Labor Board would have
held management's action to be an unfair labor practice. And
if it had, it is doubtful that the federal courts would have en-
forced the Board's order of reinstatement. If I read the cases
correctly, unions are free to strike in the sense that they con-
certedly walk out and stay out. Any discipline then imposed by
management is illegal, because the conventional, honest-to-good-
ness strike is protected activity. But the Supreme Court will
probably not regard these pseudo-strikes as protected activities
under the labor act.
The trend of decisions on picketing indicates a retreat from
the Supreme Court's Thornhill doctrine2 of 1940-that peaceful
picketing is constitutionally protected free speech. State and
lower federal courts are now taking the position that even peace-
ful picketing to achieve an illegal objective is properly enjoin-
able. Apparently this is true whether the objective is declared
illegal by statute or by the courts at common law. And in its
first picketing decision in six years, a unanimous Supreme Court
recently decided in the Giboney3 case that peaceful picketing to
2. Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736.
3. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949) 336 U. S. 490, 69
S. Ct. 684.
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compel an employer to do an illegal act is properly enjoinable.
That was where a union of ice-wagon drivers in Kansas City
picketed an ice manufacturer in order to make it agree with
other ice manufacturers that they would sell ice wholesale only
to unionized deliverers. Holding that the ice manufacturer's
compliance with this picketing request would be a violation of
the Missouri anti-monopoly statute, the state court upheld an
injunction against this picketing. It is hard to say exactly what
this decision means. But it suggests that state legislatures may
now circumvent the constitutional protection of peaceful picket-
ing by declaring unlawful what the employer is requested to do
in compliance with such picketing. And other cases imply that
secondary peaceful picketing used to put across statutorily il-
legal boycotts may also be enjoined as attempted circumvention
of state and federal prohibitions against boycotting.
All of this, taken with certain parts of the Taft-Hartley Act
and the Supreme Court's Lewis4 case of 1947, means that organ-
ized labor's collective bargaining strength has been weakened.
As a result, arm's length dealing between management and the
union is heightened. At the same time, other fairly recent deci-
sions have put management on the spot. Thus, before the Wag-
ner Act, if an employer did not wish to bargain with the union
over certain demands, he did not have to do so. Of course, he
might provoke a strike by such a refusal to bargain; but he was
free to fight it out with economic weapons if he wanted to. Sec-
tion 8 (5) of the Wagner Act gave the unions a great advantage,
compelling an employer to bargain with the union in good faith.
While this did not compel agreement, it did require counter-
offers, and so forth. And it virtually put an end to unilateral
disposition by management of all matters concerning terms and
conditions of employment.
At first the employer's statutory obligation to bargain in good
faith was assumed to apply only to the traditional subject-
matters of collective agreements. Employers still claimed an
area of exclusive management prerogative within which they
were still free to take unilateral action. That is, they were still
free to manage. But in the J. H. Allison merit increase case,"
4. United States v. United Mine Workers of America and Lewis (1947)
330 U. S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677.
5. NLR8 v. J. H. Allison & Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1948) 165 F. (2d) 766,
cert. deni .rd
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and in the Inkznd Steel pension bargaining case,0 the Supreme
Court has put an end to that notion. It begins to look as if there
is nothing sacred left at all in the way of exclusive management
prerogative. For almost everything at some point or other af-
fects terms and conditions of employment and is thus a subject
of collective bargaining under the NLRA.
Of course, management does not have to agree on any propo-
sals raised by a union. But to bargain in good faith, it must
make counter-proposals. Management fears that the union will
snap up one of these counter proposals, in order to apply the
principle of the entering wedge. Skilled management will try to
avoid these embarrassing bargaining demands by tying them in
with matters which the unions regard as more vital, playing one
off against the other in order to wear the union down. But if the
Board makes employers bargain on isolated demands during the
term of an agreement, this strategy may be defeated.
Some management lawyers believe that the way out of this
dilemma is to have Congress outline an area of exclusive man-
agerial prerogative or to set up a list of the items which are the
only proper subject-matters for collective bargaining. I am in-
clined to think, however, that their only escape is to persuade
Congress that it should repeal Section 8 (a) (5) altogether. But
it is probably too late, for the idea that the employer is obliged
by law to bargain in good faith is now deeply imbedded.
When 8 (5) first appeared in the Wagner Act, it seemed ab-
solutely necessary to the entire statutory plan. At that time
there is little doubt that it contemplated bargaining only over the
then-traditionally recognized subjects of collective agreements,
as they were known in 1935. But statutes seem to acquire new
meanings with the changing of the times. Yet it is hard to see
how the NLRB and the courts could refrain from regarding al-
most everything in industry as affecting conditions of employ-
ment. Now that unions are so well established, however, Con-
gress might well decide that they no longer need a crutch like
8 (a) (5) to make employers bargain over novel items. Indeed,
I think it is apparent that they do not. And the continued good
relations between employers and a non-complying union prove
this. In the meantime, Congress has ducked the issue by declar-
6. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB (C. C. A. 7, 1949) 170 F. (2d) 247,
cert. denied.
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ing in the Taft Act that unions are also required to bargain in
good faith. Now, at least, if a union lays down unilateral de-
mands from which it refuses to budge, the employer is permitted
to be equally arbitrary and to ignore them.
From a pressure group point of view, collective bargaining
does not make a very pretty picture. It has been said that man-
agement has it to give and the employees have it to get; and that
the unions are there to see that they get it. This implies that
management and the unions are the only parties really involved
and that anything they agree upon is all right. The bargaining
process is seen as a compromise between management preroga-
tive, based on the ownership and control of property, on the one
hand, and union monopoly of labor on the other. But this is
hardly a true picture; or, if it is, it ought not to be. Manage-
ment is no longer a private group, free to do only what is expedi-
ent. In our system, management is entrusted with the production
and distribution of goods for the entire community. Thus, it
fronts for all of us as consumers. Management is the group
responsible for the profitable operation of our production and
distribution systems. Thus, it fronts for all of us as investors-
.and that means everyone who owns stocks and bonds, who has
savings in the bank, or who has bought life or retirement in-
surance. *Management is in direct control of our means of mak-
ing a livelihood. Thus, in a way, management fronts for all who
have to live by wages and salaries earned from employment in
production and distribution enterprises. And most small retail
,enterprises, banks and landlords are indirectly dependent on the
successful operation of local industries.
This relationship of trust toward the entire economy involves
management in a terrific responsibility. In discharging this re-
sponsibility, management cannot insist on freedom to do what
it finds most convenient, merely because it has control of prop-
,erty. At the same time it needs scope to exercise whatever
managerial acumen and discretion it has. Responsible manage-
ment should exercise its stewardship in a manner most consistent
-with the recognition of all these interests for which it is fronting.
If it does, it will then be the conduit through which all these
interests are served.
Actually, much the same can be said about unions. Indeed,
mnions and union leaders are a new type of management, with
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/1
NATURE OF BARGAINING AGREEMENT
much the same responsibilities that the conventional manage-
ment class has inherited. They perform an important function
in protecting individual workers from arbitrary treatment and
against some of the vicissitudes of economic life. By their con-
trol of the most basic element in all production and distribution
-labor-they can affect the interests of all of us as consumers.
Certainly their thoughtless use of power can imperil investment
in the enterprises on which we all depend. Hence, unions should
also act as conduits through which these various interests are
represented.
Thus, successful collective bargaining is more than just two
warring factions achieving industrial peace on the basis of any
expedients available. It is true that each group has to get results
for their immediate constituents; and frequently this is attempted
regardless of the social cost. But this process can sometimes be
harmful to all of these other interests dependent upon efficiently
operated industry. The wonder is that the community does not
step in to see that this bargaining is fairly and skillfully carried
out. Collective bargaining as we know it today is a kind of cul-
tural lag. It is conducted in the same way, and on the same free
enterprise assumptions, that prevailed in the days of individual
bargaining, when we really had a free market economy. But
with the development of employers' associations, administered
prices, labor monopolies, industry-wide bargaining and wage,
pattern-setting by the power centers like the U. S. Steel and the
United Steel Workers, it is sometimes hard to believe that we
still live in a free market economy. If our economy is subject
to such controls, why do we leave these controls in private hands?
I would like to point out a few homely analogies, to illustrate
what I have in mind. In England, the king's proctor is present
in all divorce litigation. His job is to see that the parties raise
all matters before the court. He is there to preserve the public
interest in the institution of marriage. In some continental
European countries, the equivalent of our attorney general al-
ways appears in important private litigation. His job is to see
that all implications of a precedent-making decision are carefully
considered. What he reports gets full publicity, so that the com-
munity will know just what is going on. When some burning
issue arises before our own Supreme Court in a suit between
private parties, there are thousands of others whose interests
Washington University Open Scholarship
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depend on the precedent set, although they don't have a cent
involved in this case. Hence, the Supreme Court allows them to
file briefs as amici curiae-friends of the court-to be sure that
all points of view are considered.
By analogy, why shouldn't the various dependent outside in-
terests insist that their points of view be considered in collective
bargaining between private parties? The question is, how can it
be done? There is probably more to lose than gain by compulsory
arbitration-the public imposition of the terms and conditions of
employment. The War Labor Board technique was all right for
a national emergency; but it would be of dubious value now. I
guess that we must simply trust management and unions to
assume and discharge their fiduciary responsibilities in their
private bargaining. But as a public we can insist that the parties
know what these responsibilities are in each case; and as a public
we are entitled to know in detail just how the parties faced and
dealt with these matters. This would mean complete publicity
of all that goes on in private collective bargaining, with the sanc-
tions of adverse public opinion when community interests are
ignored. But it also means a public which cares about and under-
stands what is going on. It could also mean systematic media-
tion in all important bargaining-and not the glorified horse-
trading kind which is used to get any sort of agreement at all
costs. Such mediation, rather, would see that all interests are
considered and dealt with intelligently, with the threat of ad-
verse publicity if they are ignored.
This thesis rests on the fact that a collective agreement is not
a contract between private parties in the ordinary sense of that
term. It is more like a privately drawn code of laws to govern
the employment relationship in a limited area. Indeed, the
French have virtually adopted collective agreements as public
statutes; and our Railway Labor Act of 1926 was drafted by the
railroads and the brotherhoods themselves and was then enacted
as law by Congress. Our courts have frequently referred to the
collective agreement as a treaty between warring factions. In-
deed, the English courts would not enforce these agreements at
all. They said that the parties must do it themselves by recourse
to economic conflict, just as nations have always enforced
treaties. Anyway, if collective agreements are like little laws
and treaties, governing broad areas of important social activity,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/1
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then it is a matter of public interest what these agreements con-
tain and how they are achieved. And delegation to management
and the unions of the power to make them is a trust that the
public has the right to see fulfilled.
The legal significance of a collective agreement has always
been uncertain. Some courts have called it a mere gentlemen's
agreement, unenforcible at law; and the treaty analogy is still
made. Our Supreme Court has said it is not a contract of em-
ployment at all. It is, rather, merely a schedule of terms and
commitments, which become part of the individual workers' con-
tracts of employment, whether or not they belong to the union.
Insofar as the collective agreement is a contract at all, it has to
to be one between the employer and the union. This has led to
much confusion, since most unions are not incorporated and thus
cannot be legal parties to contracts. And if they are not legally
recognized parties, they cannot act as plaintiffs in law suits to
enforce these so-called contracts; nor can they be sued on them.
Traditionally, only individual employees could enforce the terms
of collective agreements, in some states only the members of the
unions.
In recent years, however, our courts are beginning to recog-
nize collective agreements as legally binding contracts. This
development means that unions may secure rights for themselves
in contracts, over and above the rights secured for their con-
stituents, with the legal power to sue for the enforcement of
these rights. This recognition of unions as legal persons, capable
of acting as parties to contracts and law-suits, has largely been
the result of legislation. And now the Taft-Hartley Act permits
unions to sue and be sued in the federal arena on their collective
agreements.
These new developments have raised some interesting issues.
Just what rights can a union secure under a collective agree-
ment; and just what obligations does it assume? The general
idea has always been that a collective agreement is merely a
series of concessions by management. To begin with, manage-
ment has everything; and the agreement represents the whittling
down of management's rights due to collective bargaining. Most
of these concessions are made on behalf of the employees, to
govern the terms of their personal contracts of employment, and
are not promises of benefits to the union, as such. About the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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only things that unions get for themselves are recognition, some
form of union security like the union or the preferential shop,
and the right to initiation fees and union dues check-offs, with
possible controls over apprenticeship and the like. For breaches
of these commitments, unions have been permitted to maintain
actions against employers, including suits brought to require the
return of runaway shops. The employees themselves have to sue
for the enforcement of the other terms of these agreements, con-
cerning wages, seniority, and the like. Surely their unions should
be allowed to maintain class suits on behalf of the employees,
although this privilege is usually denied. The resulting cumber-
some and costly recourse to the courts is a case of arrested de-
velopment, which would be serious if employers and unions had
not worked out the practical solution of voluntary arbitration.
How about the obligations of unions under collective agree-
ments? About all an employer can get in exchange for his
commitments in a collective agreement is continued production-
no work stoppages for the life of the agreement. Most employers
assume that they don't get even this unless the union signs a
no-strike pledge and promises that the union officials will take
action against wild-cat strikes and work stoppages. Of course,
unions say that employers get a supply of labor in exchange for
their concessions in collective agreements. But employers get no
more labor now than they did before unions existed-and now
they get it in a controlled labor market.
Some curious angles show up in actions to enforce the terms
of collective agreements. When individual workers sue under
these agreements, money adjustments are usually appropriate.
When unions sue employers under them, however, their rights
can normally be enforced only by court orders requiring the
employers specifically to comply with the contract provisions.
Thus, compliance with a closed or union shop agreement occurs
only if the commitment is actually complied with. And the harm
caused by a runaway shop is cured by ordering the shop to be
brought back. In effect, courts can enforce union rights under a
contract only by the equitable remedy of the injunction. In the
past courts have denied unions such remedy because there was
no mutuality of obligation on the unions' part. That is, the
unions have promised nothing in return. But this is changing;
and a binding consideration can now be supplied through no-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/1
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strike pledges. Some unions will not make these pledges while
they are subject to suits for damages under the Taft Act. If
they refuse to sign them, however, they give employers a strong
bargaining advantage. And if they do sign them, they give
employers an effective protection against strikes during the life
of the contract, either by suits for damages against the unions
or by direct disciplinary action.
A recent development, however, endangers the legal effect of
collective agreements. About three months ago a labor lawyer
friend of mine told me about a suit he had brought in a federal
court. This suit was to procure, under a maintenance of mem-
bership clause, the discharge of three employees who had been
deprived of membership because they had refused to pay certain
fines. The employer's contention that non-payment of fines is
not non-payment of dues under the Taft-Hartley Act is not in-
volved, because the employer moved the court to dismiss the
action. The employer argued that this was a labor dispute be-
tween itself and the union, in which the court had no jurisdiction
to grant injunctive relief under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. My
labor lawyer friend was furious at the impertinence of this
defense. The company hiding behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
indeed!
This is both funny and serious at the same time. How can a
breach of contract be a labor dispute within the meaning of the
federal anti-injunction act? For equitable relief to enforce con-
tracts is quite different from using the injunction to break up
bargaining and organizational strikes. This is apparent from
the history of the labor injunction and of the law passed to pre-
vent its abuse. And if the employer's argument is sound, many
collective agreements will become virtually unenforcebale. This
would compel unions to use economic coercion to enforce con-
tracts. So I said to my lawyer friend: "Look; suppose your union
had signed a no-strike pledge in its agreement with the company.
You would agree that if your union nevertheless called a strike
in breach of its contract, the company could secure an injunctive
order requiring compliance with the pledge." When he shouted:
"No, that's entirely different," I really wanted to laugh.
But it looks as if the federal courts are going to adopt the
position proposed by the company in this case. In my opinion
this is entirely wrong; but the Supreme Court seems to have
Washington University Open Scholarship
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encouraged such loose usage of the term "labor dispute," that it
alone can repair this damage done to the enforcement of collec-
tive agreements under modern anti-injunction acts. In the mean-
time, employers rely on Section 301 of the Taft Act to enforce
no-strike pledges by actions for damages.
So dubious is the status of the collective agreement in our
courts, that the arbitration of grievances arising under such
contracts has become the main hope for the future. This device
of arbitration is flourishing these days. And it affords a versa-
tile, expeditious and inexpensive method for interpreting and
applying the terms of collective agreements. If it were not for
this safety valve, it is hard to say how the thousands of collec-
tive agreements in this country would be administered.
But even arbitration would be a flop if it were not for the
good sense of the employers and unions themselves. For labor
arbitration does not have much standing before the law. At
common law the courts did not like arbitration of any kind,
regarding it as a rival undertaking to oust them of their rightful
jursidiction. This hangover still exists today with respect to
labor arbitration. Most of our legislatures have made an honest
institution of commercial arbitration, although they have sur-
rounded it with technicalities. But few of them have put labor
arbitration on a solid footing. Agreements to arbitrate in the
labor field are enforceable in only a few states. In many of them
a written submission to arbitration of an existing dispute is en-
forceable, if all of the technical statutory requirements are ful-
filled. But in some states even such submissions are legal nulli-
ties. And the courts will enforce awards rendered in arbitrations
only if all of the technicalities required by the statutes have been
observed.
The agreements to arbitrate contained in modern collective
agreements are absolutely unenforceable in most of our courts.
This is because only a few states have statutes providing for the
enforcement of future disputes involving labor matters- that is,
of present agreements to arbitrate future disputes which have
not yet arisen. The flourishing state of labor arbitration in this
country is a high tribute to the determination of employers and
unions to provide their own private courts for the settlement of
grievances, the state of the law notwithstanding.
What we need is a uniform practice for the enforcement of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1949/iss1/1
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collective labor agreements. The constitutional power exercised
in passing the Wagner Act, which is responsible for most of our
labor agreements, would certainly permit Congress to enact a
uniform method for the enforcement and administration of these
same agreements. This would mean not only a standard method
of enforcing these collective agreements in the courts, but also a
uniform procedure to govern labor arbitration. Such a course
seems imperative under a master agreement between a corpora-
tion and an international union covering the company's plants
in many different states. Why should an agreement of this sort
be left subject to various different interpretations and applica-
tions from state to state? Yet where Congress leaves the enforce-
ment of collective agreements to the states, this is exactly what
could happen.
My enthusiasm for arbitration is confined to the adjudication
of grievances raised under already bargained and executed agree-
ments. I do not like so-called terminal arbitration-the arbitra-
tion of collective bargaining disputes. My reasons for this are
simple. In the arbitration of grievances under a contract, the
arbitrator has some standards to apply in making his awards.
These standards are the provisions of the contract itself. In
terminal arbitration the arbitrator has no standards to follow.
In making his award he is reduced to guesswork. Furthermore,
he is doing a job which the parties themselves should be doing.
They have abdicated in favor of a neutral and are dodging their
proper responsibilities. And if the arbitrator hands them, or
either of them, a lemon, it is their own fault. Naturally, there
are some occasions when terminal arbitration is a wise recourse
-when almost anything the arbitrator does is better than having
a strike. But these instances are few and chiefly in enterprises
where strikes simply cannot be afforded.
One school of thought is that a collective agreement cannot
and should not attempt to cover all aspects of the relationship
between an employer and a union. According to this school, a
collective agreement is merely a framework of general provisions
which indicate only roughly what the terms and conditions of
employment shall be. It must be made definite by the parties
themselves during their processing of grievances arising under
it. If they are unable to do this, the gaps must be filled in by an
arbitrator. According to this school, the arbitrator should be
Washington University Open Scholarship
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guided as far as possible by the terms of the agreement; but he
should expand the agreement to take care of situations over-
looked or omitted by the parties.
But this is anathema to the proponents of another school of
thought. They believe that an agreement should express all of
the commitments made by management. If anything is left out,
the assumption should be that it was not intended to be covered.
These people look on the arbitrator as a judge, merely to inter-
pret and apply the agreement as it is written and not to add to
it or to change it in any way. All they want to know is where
they stand under the contract. Of course, they admit that the
arbitrator must resolve ambiguities in the agreement and breathe
'meaning into its provisions in specific grievances. And they con-
cede that an arbitrator must define such terms as "just cause"
in discharge cases, where neither the contract nor the plant rules
have defined all the causes for discharge.
Personally, I believe that there is room for both of these
schools of thought, depen~ding upon what the parties themselves
want. Some employees and unions, realizing the practical short-
comings of written words and phrases, actually want a perma-
nent umpire to help them make their collective agreement a
living and growing document. They want him to add to it, as
occasion arises, by the judicious interpolation of new provisions.
This is a process analogous to the growth of the common law,
'where precedents assume authoritative force in themselves,
aside from the already existing law. But this is a dangerous
process to entrust to ad hoc arbitrators; and many companies
and unions, jealous of their own bargaining privileges, refuse to
hand over this power even to a permanent umpire. So I say, if
the parties themselves want an outsider to help them make their
agreement grow and to settle all grievances for them, then I can
see nothing against it if they can find one. But such people are
extremely rare. And it is far more consistent with the traditions
of arbitration to have the arbitrator act merely as a judge.
The scope of modern collective agreements is an enormous
subject in itself and impossible to cover at this time. But a few
deserve special mention.
One of the most troublesome items is union security. Of the
several kinds of union security, probably the type most desired
by unions and most disliked by employers is the closed shop. Of
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course, this gives the maximum of security to a union. But some
unions seem to need it far more than other unions do. The closed
shop is objectionable because it gives unions a strangle hold on
job opportunities and interferes with the intelligent choice of
employees. This is especially true if the union is free to stipulate
entrance requirements and the conditions of remaining in good
standing, and also has the right to demand the discharge of non-
members. But certain unions, notably those in the typographical,
building and maritime enterprises, value the closed union shop
for these very reasons. Here are groups of workers who move
frequently from job to job, from employer to employer. They
regard union membership as the only safe test for proficiency
in their trades and as the only guarantee that their potential jobs
won't be grabbed away from them by unqualified workers who
are willing to underbid them. You can't blame unions in these
enterprises for adhering to this monopolistic pattern and for try-
ing to change the Taft Act in this respect.
For industry in general, however, it is hard to make out a
convincing case for either the closed or union shop. Before the
Wagner Act was passed, the closed or union shop offered the only
way for a union to protect its standards from the undercutting
influence of non-union competition in a particular plant. But by
making a union the exclusive bargaining representative of all the
workers in a unit, whether or not they belonged to the union, the
Wagner Act eliminated that competitive hazard. But it created
an entirely new incentive for the closed and the union shop,
because of the introduction of so-called "free-riders." These are
the non-union workers in a bargaining unit who profit by the
union's efforts but who do not support it by paying dues. Ac-
tually, they do the same work as union members and take home
more money; for they keep the amount the others pay as dues
and initiation fees.
To eliminate this inequality, many union leaders have sworn
that they will get the closed or, under the Taft Act, the union
shop. This would make all workers who are serviced by the
union, pay for such service; and it would bring non-union take-
home pay down to the union level. But this is like burning down
a house to get rid of the pests. A much simpler device would
satisfy most unions in general industry. And this device has
none of the undesirable features of the closed or even of the
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union shop, under any present or future state of the law. This
is the universal dues check-off-the so-called Rand7 formula.
This Rand formula is essentially as follows: Let the employer
agree to check off and pay to the union the equivalent of union
dues for everybody in the bargaining unit, whether or not he
belongs to the union. This removes most of the incentive for the
closed or union shop. At the same time it gives monetary recog-
nition of the service the union is providing for the non-union
workers. Some workers may object because they do not want
to join the union but are nevertheless required to support it.
Also the check-off of dues in some states is illegal without the
consent of the workers. But I think it should be permitted by
statute, both state and federal. For the union earns this con-
tribution, not only by representing all of the workers in the
bargaining of contracts, but also by servicing the grievances of
members and non-members alike. Payment for this function
may result in a more effective servicing of the grievances of
non-members. Furthermore, the analogy to the payment of taxes
is apparent. It would certainly be odd if Republicans could avoid
paying taxes in a Democratic administration. And the non-union
worker is free to join the union at any time, especially if he
wishes to influence the policies of the union.
In the meantime the union shop under the Taft Act achieves
the same result. Many employers will still not concede the union
shop. But some have found it satisfactory under the Taft Act
because the union cannot request the discharge of ousted mem-
bers except for the non-payment of initiation fees and dues.
Thus, some employers have agreed to the union shop with the
proviso that it shall remain only so long as these Taft Act re-
strictions are on the books.
An essential in every collective agreement is a grievance pro-
cedure providing for arbitration as the last step. This is the
device that makes a labor contract ultimately effective. The func-
tion of the grievance procedure is to furnish the workers and the
union with an opportunity to have alleged wrongs righted in
accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. Some
people believe that management should have the right to file
7. In re Ford Motor Company of Canada and United Automobile, Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (CIO), 1 La. 439,(1946).
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grievances and have them processed through arbitration. But
management does not need this right because it is already in a
position to take action. Thus it may change rates, job assign-
ments and otherwise modify the terms of employment. And it
may discipline workers who are thought to be breaking the plant
rules or terms of the contract. The grievance procedure allows
the union and the workers to call management to account if they
think it has violated the agreement or has dealt unjustly with
any of the employees. This leaves management the power to act
and provides a brake on such power.
There is much to say about the limitation of periods during
which grievances may be filed. The parties to contracts should
agree upon time limitations and live up to them. They should
also reflect upon some of the following matters. May a grievance
filed under one contract carry over into another contract period?
May a so-called test grievance apply retroactively to other mem-
bers of the unit who are in the same position but who have not
filed grievances of their own? May the union itself file blanket
grievances for all employees affected in cases of this type? Here
is a rather unique situation. An employee in a unit missed eligi-
bility for a three week vacation in 1949 because on the cut-off
date he lacked just five days of the necessary 15 years of service.
This presents a current 1949 grievance. But in the arbitration
of this grievance may the employee question a two months' lay-
off in 1938 by showing that it violated the seniority provisions
of the 1938 agreement, when he had neglected to file a grievance
in 1938? Remember, the current grievance is whether he has
the necessary 15 years service in 1949; and if the 1938 lay-off
period is not subtracted from his seniority, he has it. Would it
be desirable to include in the grievance procedure a clause re-
quiring an arbitrator first to determine whether the union may
go back of the current agreement at all, before he hears evidence
on the merits of the 1938 lay-off issue? While this device of
deciding preliminary issues might detract from the educational
value of airing all the matters underlying the main grievance, it
might prove to be most convenient in other ways. Or should
contracts simply provide that incidents occurring under previous
agreements cannot be considered except under grievances filed
at that time?
A talk like this can hardly scratch the surface. Think of all
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the problems involved in seniority and wage provisions, with all
aspects of overtime. While I don't blame unions for trying to
establish strict seniority, I don't blame employers for insisting
upon merit rating to govern promotions in a line of progression.
Most unions will admit that ability to perform should be a con-
dition to promotion. But where a union agrees that seniority
shall prevail only where relative ability to perform is equal,
then I think it must accept a merit rating plan for determining
this comparison, if the employer wants it that way. Of course,
it may bargain over the details of this plan. If it does not wish
to do so, however, the employer may write his own ticket, as
long as he does it fairly.
But some unions hate to bargain about such things as merit
rating, job evaluations and incentive plans. If these items are to
be introduced, they prefer to have the employer assume the
entire responsibility and then attack his position in grievances
and arbitrations. Where unions refuse to bargain on these items,
does an employer have a free hand to develop techniques unilat-
erally? I would have supposed that he does, although nowadays
the field of unilateral action is narrowing rapidly.
This suggests another question. What if an agreement is com-
pletely silent about a certain matter, such as whether or not
separate operations may be coordinated and put on assembly
line production, and whether or not the various jobs in a certain
department may be changed from an individual to a group in-
centive basis? If these matters are not covered at all, does this
mean that management has the right during the life of the con-
tract unilaterally to make these changes as part of its function
to manage? I have always supposed that it did mean just that.
Naturally, the union may interpose bargaining demands con-
cerning these changes, with a view to modifying them in the
next contract. But I should think management would have to
have this unilateral right, as long as its acts are not inconsistent
with provisions of the current agreement. I do not think this
right is dependent on the management clause in the contract,
because I believe that such clauses are generally meaningless.
About all they fairly imply is that management has the right to
manage, which leaves the main question up in the air. Nowadays
this unilateral right is always subject to curtailment if the union
insists upon bargaining over the subject matter involved.
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Whether or not management's unilateral innovations become
modified depends entirely upon the course of the bargaining
itself.
Another word or two about pension plans. It comes hard for
employers with established pension plans to agree to share the
administration of these plans with unions. By and large, retire-
ment plans conform to rather rigid patterns. To what extent is
it possible for unions to effect changes in these patterns? Do
they want to have a say in the investment of the funds or in the
choice of the trustees handling the funds? Can unions help to
secure a greater return on the funds invested in these plans, and
should they be given a chance to see if they could? To the extent
that such plans cover employees outside the bargaining unit, is
not union bargaining on these plans inappropriate? These and
other questions may have to be answered; yet they seem out of
place when it transpires that this whole fuss over pension plans
goes back chiefly to the union's desire to prevent compulsory re-
tirement under these plans at the age of 65. Certainly these plans
are conditions of employment under the NLRA. Employers value
them because they stabilize employment. Workers with vested
rights in such plans will think twice before they lightly discard
this advantage. The pension is quite as important as the other
money items like wages and vacations.
To avoid some of the difficulties which bargaining over pension
plans has caused, it has been suggested that they should all be
abolished and the funds and contributions be used to support an
improved government social security program. By thus taking
these plans out of the area of collective bargaining, it is said, all
of the difficulties of sharing administration of them with unions
will disappear, a healthy mobility of labor will ensue, absolute
uniformity of retirement planning will follow, and workers may
retire at any age. Furthermore, the employees will not be in-
hibited in bargaining over the traditional items of collective
agreements, since they will have less to lose if they are fired for
unprotected activities and can pick up their retirement status
unimpaired at any new plant they go to. But employers will not
see it in this light. They will object to losing the advantages of
stability inherent in private pension plans. And many employees,
who are not so enthusiastic about government social security,
may also object. Anyhow, by extending the scope of the em-
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ployer's obligation to bargain to cover this and other novel items,
the Labor Board had opened a veritable Pandora's box in the
industrial world.
The whole matter of bargaining and administering a collective
agreement is hard to cover in advance by rules of law. In our
system the parties themselves set the pace. The legislatures,
administrative boards and the courts follow the lead, interfering
to set the rules only after the parties have become obstreperous.
This is essentially a laissez faire philosophy, where the parties
are expected to create the pattern for themselves. But even
when intervention becomes necessary, the cooperation of the
parties is welcome, as in the original Railway Labor Act. Indeed,
many faults of the Taft-Hartley Act are due to organized labor's
refusal in 1947 to discuss frankly the questionable practices of
unions.
Most of the experts-people like Davis, Taylor, Leiserson,
Witte and Garrison-say that the whole process should be left to
the parties themselves. But as I said before, we have to have
some rules. Employers cannot be left free to bust unions, to dis-
courage organization and unilaterally to impose the terms of
employment. And unions cannot be left free to run employers
into bankruptcy or to defy the operation of the general economy.
This applies not only to conventional employer unfair practices.
It applies also to extreme bargaining techniques like sympathetic
pressures, union refusals to bargain, blind wage-pattern follow-
ing, and the defiance of restraints on anti-competitive conduct.
And it means that the parties must develop a proper regard for
the interests of other parts of the community.
Concerning the scope of collective agreements, the sky may
be the limit if the parties use their power in a trustworthy
fashion. But their rights and duties begin to ask for definition
when they push too far for selfish ends. We know just enough
about the whole collective bargaining process to realize that the
parties themselves are most familiar with its procedures, its
uses and its needs. But the public can recognize abuses when
they occur. And it should leave the development of the whole
process to the parties as long as-but only as long as-they
remain responsible.
This is also true concerning the enforcement of collective agree-
ments when they are made. Here again we have a self-develop-
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ing process of the parties which so far is admirable. But arbitra-
tion must be carefully nurtured and respected by the parties. If
it is not, then the resulting legislative restrictions may stifle its
development.
In this whole field of labor-management relations it is up to
the parties to keep the rules of the game so fluid, so adaptable
and so beneficial, that the public is willing to leave them alone.
And the parties must learn to stop looking at arbitration awards
and court decisions simply as victories if they win or as defeats
if they lose. They must regard them as parts of a process of
education and development where, in the long run, everybody
wins. In these ways we stand to achieve a stable and lasting
state of labor-management peace and cooperation.
Washington University Open Scholarship
